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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CONTENTS

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

Nuclear Force To Get Mobile Surface-to-Surface Missile (Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 23 Aug 80).....	1
--	---

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EEC Commissioner for Development Interviewed (Claude Cheysson Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Aug 80).....	3
---	---

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD Alarmed About Rise of FDP in Polls (Werner Heilemann; STERN, 14 Aug 80).....	16
Low Morale, Indifference Said To Plague Bundeswehr (Mario R. Dederichs; STERN, 14 Aug 80).....	19
Strauss Team Member Kiep's Political Style Examined (Uwe Zimmer; STERN, 24 Jul 80).....	23

FRANCE

PCF's Current Internal Friction Reviewed (Guy Konopnicki; PARIS MATCH, 25 Jul 80).....	26
Police Demonstrations Indicative of Discontent (Philippe Krasnopolski; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 28 Jul 80)....	30

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

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Change in Nature of Corsican Terrorism Noted (Michel Labro, Jean-Louis Eyssartel; L'EXPRESS, 23 Aug 80)	35
Location, Mission of Foreign Legion Discussed (Vicente Talon; DEFENSA, Apr 80).....	38
ITALY	
PRI's Spadolini: Good Relations With PCI 'Indispensable' (Giovanni Spadolini Interview; LA STAMPA, 21 Aug 80).....	48
PSI Aide Scores Anti-PSI Offensive, Overtures to PCI (Enrico Manca Interview; LA STAMPA, 9 Aug 80).....	51
SPAIN	
Briefs Basque Military Intelligence Leaks	54
UNITED KINGDOM	
U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Soviet Reaction Discussed (Editorial; THE TIMES, 4 Sep 80).....	55

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

NUCLEAR FORCE TO GET MOBILE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 23 Aug 80 p 35

[Article by Jean de Galard: "Strategic Nuclear Force's Future Mobile Strategic Launcher Will Be a Surface-to-Surface Missile"]

[Text] In a statement released on 30 July 1980, Yvon Bourges, defense minister since 1975, replied at length to the criticism leveled a few days earlier on two occasions by Michel Debre who himself had served as minister of state for national defense from June 1969 to March 1973. Debre criticized the present defense policy, decrying particularly the inadequate expansion of the "strategic nuclear retaliation force."

Bourges' statement referred to the three phases which have marked "the continuity of the French national effort" since 1959. He recalled that up to 1969, defense spending on nuclear research and on development and production of first-generation atomic weapons totaled 36.108 billion francs. During the second phase from 1970 to 1974, this spending amounted to only 21.323 billion francs. The third phase which began in 1974 was devoted to modernizing the strategic forces and increasing their striking power. Defense spending during this third phase was 42.058 billion francs, more than half of which--26.846 billion francs to be exact--was allotted to studies and research. "It is clearly evident," the statement added, "that since 1975 the effort has centered on research--testing costs have stabilized since the shift to underground tests in 1974--that is to say on preparing for the future, action that is obviously not the mark of a policy of renunciation."

In this same statement, the defense minister mentioned for the first time "a new mobile surface-to-surface component," the principle of which was approved during the 10 June 1980 meeting of the Defense Council. Studies of this component are scheduled to be submitted to governmental authorities for approval in 1982.

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The defense minister was more specific on this subject than the president of the Republic had been in his 26 June 1980 press conference. The president had at that time simply announced "preparation of a mobile strategic launcher." Admittedly he had added "that technical decisions on this launcher's characteristics could be made before the end of the year."

The more specific reference made by Yvon Bourges--although he did not use the term "ballistic" in his statement--indicates that the new launcher will be the planned surface-to-surface missile designated the SX. The latter's type of mobility still has to be determined, however, i.e. mounted on a truck, or on a tracked vehicle, or on rails.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EEC COMMISSIONER FOR DEVELOPMENT INTERVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 pp 53-59

[Interview with EEC Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson, by Siradou Diallo, Sennen Andriamirado and Jean-Louis Buchet at the JEUNE AFRIQUE building, date not given]

[Text] Medium height, a wide forehead and a generous smile. At 60, Mr Claude Cheysson still retains a young and sporty air. A grandfather, he is also "a young father:" the oldest of his six children is 36-years old and the youngest, 18 months. Enarque, former pupil of the Teachers' College and the Polytechnic College, he once collected university diplomas as he collects today decorative objects from the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific: those countries for which he is responsible at the EEC.

From the position of UN observer in Palestine to the French Embassy in Jakarta (Indonesia), passing through High Commissioner of France in Saigon, secretary general of the Commission on Technical Cooperation in Africa, director of the Organization for Exploiting the Saharan Subsoil and French secretary of state for Algerian affairs, Mr Cheysson's full career has led him to travel and come into contact with the realities of the peoples of the Third World very early. For this reason the French government appointed him to the EEC to take charge of the Development Department. And this, despite the fact he never hid his position toward the Georges Pompidou or Valery Giscard d'Estaing governments: in 1978, for example, during the legislative elections he openly supported the coalition of the left against the Giscardians. But he does not seem surprised by his nomination: "I do not share in the secret of the successive presidents, but I have had the impression that, choosing a socialist, they wanted to show a certain open-mindedness."

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Thus, for 7 years he has been in Brussels, taking care of all the matters of cooperation between the European Common Market and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. He is the main author of the famous Lome agreements, of which everyone talks but few really know.

[Question] As the European Community's Commissioner for Development, aren't you in a certain way the superminister of European colonies?

[Answer] Minister? Certainly not: there is no European government. The executive of the EEC is a commission which does not have the powers of a government. As for the term "colony," I categorically reject it.

[Question] Nevertheless, Africa's relations with Europe are in many ways similar to what they were in the colonial era. Especially economically.

[Answer] Perhaps. But the fact that collaborators of a magazine like JEUNE AFRIQUE identify me as a colonialist worries me. That proves that the EEC policy is not understood. Or, perhaps, it is a bad one. Now, we have no intention of having colonies.

Our reasoning is based on the idea that Europe must have and organize close relations with the countries of the Third World.

Europe is formed by countries which are advanced industrially but poor in raw materials. And the more the crisis deepens, the more the relations with the Third World are important to all the industrialized countries. These relations exist. I believe that they must be organized, structured, insured. That is our objective.

Presidents' Accomplice

[Question] But those relations take more notice of European interests than of Third World interests.

[Answer] What the Third World countries wish, it seems to me, is precisely for these relations to be reliable, stable, predictable and independent of market fluctuations. Not to have to depend discretionarily on their markets, their clients and those richer than they. That is the spirit of our policy.

[Question] Europe has established such relations only with their former colonies.

[Answer] It is true that at the European level we have been able to express this policy in an interesting and original way only with African countries to which have been added, by a historical accident, some countries of the Caribbean and the Pacific. We have barely started the same approach, the same philosophy, with the countries south of the Mediterranean.

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[Question] It still stinks of colonialism, doesn't it?

[Answer] It so happens that the governments with which we have started to organize our relations are mostly our former colonies. Our policy does not for that represent a postcolonial projection. On the contrary, certain characteristics of the so-called Lome policy are fundamentally different from the colonial approach.

First, the EEC deals with all of Africa and not with one or another African country as was the case during the colonial period where the relations of ruler to ruled prevailed. By considering all of Africa, this disappears. All the countries are not former colonies and all the European partners are not former colonial powers.

On the other hand, once the treaty is completed, the other partner does as he pleases: even if he has trouble with one or another of the European states, that does not bring about the rupture of the contract. Thus, Ethiopia broke diplomatic relations with Germany without affecting its relations with Europe.

[Question] All the same, it is through you personally that the European states influence heavily the economic decisions of African leaders. You are the economic advisor of most of the chiefs-of-state, in the sense that the decisions they make often result from private conversations you have with them.

[Answer] I absolutely deny that statement. One of the points of the Lome policy is that each country is free to use the tools of the convention as it sees fit. Some choose to apply most of the credits we grant them to agriculture, others to infrastructures and still others to social development. Each is free to favor what he wants, without pressure from us. Whatever is appropriated to Rwanda, Senegal or Jamaica is allocated regardless of the economic policy practiced by those countries. Even if we believe that country is wrong economically in not dealing with such or such a matter or in letting private enterprise or government agencies take on too much importance, we have no way of imposing anything on them.

[Question] Since you are the confidant, not to say the accomplice, of most African chiefs-of-state, you can nevertheless act as a friend.

[Answer] As a friend, maybe. But when you say that I am the confidant, if not the accomplice, of certain chiefs-of-state, I do not know if I should take that as a compliment or as a reproach. Being optimistic, I take it as a compliment.

Look, I do not believe that one can seriously deal with a developing country without multiplying personal relationships. First of all it is a question of respect. It does not seem correct to me to deal with a young being (a country is a being) by sending letters, being satisfied with calling it to meetings at the financial backer's. It seems to me quite normal to see the people on the spot to try to perceive the reality.

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[Question] By multiplying the direct contacts, you become one of the personal collaborators of the chiefs-of-state.

[Answer] Naturally, anyone who visits frequently ends up having personal relationships with some. Let me say that my relationship with JEUNE AFRIQUE proves that when you meet a certain number of times with men that are interested in the Third World, men of the Third World, a personal relationship is established. That, in this personal relationship, some get to talk, not confidentially but seriously, solidly, of their problems. I find that normal.

Compromising Relations

After all, these chiefs-of-state do not have many opportunities to talk about their problems at length and attentively outside their own environment without fearing that what they say trustingly will be used immediately to get rid of a market or exert pressure in one way or another. Thus, frequently, one Third World leader or another expresses himself more freely and openly with a European official like me. I do not have any direct power, any market to close. I have no enterprise behind me.

[Question] Aren't these personal relationships with African presidents compromising sometimes?

[Answer] No one has tried to buy me, if that is what you want to know. There is a type of person you buy and another you don't even think of buying. I do not get any pride out of it. That proves that my interlocutors think that I am immune to certain type of reasoning.

[Question] You have nevertheless received some gifts....

[Answer] The usual gifts: some small hand-crafted objects, a pagne for my wife....

[Question] Aren't you, who know Africa well, shocked by the story of the Bokassa diamonds?

[Answer] I do not know how it happened. I only know what the press has said. I am not surprised that a chief-of-state receiving an equal gives him a present. But that the gift is valuable can only be embarrassing. That is not the reason why the matter troubles me. What troubles me is that it is the subject of a scandal. What would trouble me would be if there were reasons to make a scandal. But on this I have no specific information.

[Question] Have you already met Bokassa?

[Answer] I met him once while spending 24 hours at Bangui. I have been disrespectful of a chief-of-state, but I did not have this type of squabble with him.

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[Question] You knew he was clumsy, even worrisome. But you never revealed it. That is why it is said that sometimes you are the accomplice of certain leaders.

[Answer] Not only did I not say anything, but I do not regret it. He is first of all the Central African chief of state. we do not have to judge the chief of a foreign state. That is going too far, but I believe that we must never interfere in our partners' domestic affairs. Thus, a public man who has a public responsibility in one of the countries that are close to us is respected by virtue of his functions, and he must be. That has nothing to do with our personal feelings.

Elementary Racism

[Question] Did you have personal feelings for the former president of Liberia, William Tolbert?

[Answer] I was upset by his assassination. President Tolbert was the first to try development operations in Liberia. Three-fourths of the convention of Lome's credits were used domestically and not in favor of the "American Negroes." He had made a basic effort at democratization. That it all ended in his assassination is moving.

[Question] Will your policy change toward Sergeant-President Samuel Doe?

[Answer] For the moment we have not dealt with him. But Liberia is a member of the Lome Convention. It has the right to a certain number of facilities, to free access to markets and to profit from the Stabex system. These rights will be respected. That said, what happened in Liberia was of such nature that we will be careful to check and doublecheck its end. It is one of the countries for which we will apply the rule that no aid can be released without our having assurances of its humanitarian end.

[Question] Do you think that Idi Amin, Bokassa, Macias Nguema and Samuel Doe are the only African chiefs-of-state to have spilled blood? And that they are the only ones worthy of blame before the EEC?

[Answer] Difficult question. What I find most serious with an Idi Amin or a Bokassa is their systematism. The first one had decided to make two races disappear. this elementary racism was applied systematically year after year. With Bokassa, his excesses are such that I would not wish to have to meet him. But what he had was a childish side. The children that he had cudgeled and massacred, he would have given them candy as well. Bokassa is an irresponsible, a bloody clown.

[Question] Why did you personally insist on the inclusion of a chapter devoted to human rights in the Lome Convention?

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[Answer] I never asked for a clause on human rights, for a stipulation in the Lome Convention that permits to act, to suspend or delay what is owed to a country because of a violation of human rights. International life today absolutely does not permit such a criteria, such a judgment to be set. Moreover, we were opposed to the British and the Dutch who wanted a stipulation. In return, I proposed that reference be made to human rights. I believed that, in the foreword of the convention defining the objective of a rather special cooperation, the wish to develop man in his dignity should be mentioned.

[Question] Why did you fail?

[Answer] Why? The ambassadors present in Brussels knew very well that there was no agreement among the Nine on that claim of the commission, the European parliament and some of our countries. They then said to their governments: little does it matter! That shows that we came too late. The best moment would have been at the OAU summit in Monrovia where the Africans adopted a resolution going much further than our proposition. At that moment, the Africans would have asked us:

1. "You take on the same commitments." In our societies in Europe the ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific countries] man is not treated in a dignified and acceptable way. How many police chiefs and European officials can be judged in this sense?
2. "We cannot accept it to be bilaterally coercive. In return, we agree to adopt a solemn declaration to be noted by the Convention."

We Had a Narrow Escape

[Question] We have the impression that Europe does not take the African economic crisis seriously.

[Answer] Positively, it is true. It is true that Lome II is not better because there is a crisis. What is remarkable is that Lome II is not worse because of the crisis. From that point of view, I will tell you modestly that we had a narrow escape. Had the negotiations lasted 6 or 9 months more, Lome II would have been worse, especially on the financing projects. First, because we would have had Mrs Thatcher for a longer time in the negotiations and, since she cuts credits everywhere, at the domestic level and at the level of British bilateral aid to the Commonwealth countries, she would have demanded that assistance be cut in the framework of Lome II.

[Question] The situation is so serious that for certain African countries the question is not one of investment trends of ideological options, but of survival.

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[Answer] With the last hike in oil prices, there is a series of countries going bankrupt; who, being compelled to buy oil even if they limit imports and being compelled to buy food, cannot buy anything else. And when you consider the place that certain markets for equipping the Third World have taken in our industry (for France, for example, the Third World represents more than one-third of the production of electric equipment, railroad equipment, etc.) and that all of a sudden these countries can no longer buy, that creates a real crisis that worries investors.

Oil Revenues

[Question] Do you see a solution to this problem?

[Answer] The solution: recycling the capitals available on the financial market; whether they are of oil countries' revenues or private capitals that have to be guided and placed in the Third World. There is going to be a feverish activity in the coming months to achieve this. It will involve considerable sums and will be done through international or regional financial institutions.

I am convinced that the latter--InterAmerican Development Bank, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank--can be used more than they have been. Obviously the international financial institutions and the industrialized countries will have to provide enough guarantees for them to be the big dealers on the market. There will also be, and let us not hide it from ourselves, a need for interest discounts, and it is here that budget choices must be made by the industrialized and oil countries. This will be one of the main subjects during the coming months.

American Inaction

[Question] Curiously, such a subject has not been put on the agenda of the large international meetings.

[Answer] That should have been one of the main topics at the Western summit held last June in Venice. Naturally, it is not enough to have one discussion among industrialized countries. As soon as possible there should be systematic meetings among industrialized, developing and oil countries. The three together or two by two. My ambition, as the commission member responsible for this field, is that all that should be quite advanced by the time of the special session of the United Nations in September which should relaunch the North-South debate. Why is this my ambition? Because since the UN session is not held until September, nothing must be expected from the North-South dialogue until 1981 or 1982. Now, the problems of the balance of payments are not for 1981 or 1982. They are for now.

[Question] In any case, the Third World countries have been fooled and deceived so often by the West that they have an increasing tendency not to expect too much from certain international organizations.

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[Answer] It is true that the "77" increasingly view the industrialized countries' proposals with mistrust. Especially when they concern only technical matters: energy, food, without any available financing. We are not going to indefinitely restart the matter of the UNCTAD and the raw materials. We met at Nairobi (Kenya) 4 years ago, and no significant agreements came out of it. Four years later we met in Manila, (Philippines); there, it was decided on a common bank which has not yet been created and which, even if it had, could not work since there is no agreement about raw materials. And all that for a common fund of \$750 million to be spent over a period of several years. Now, the financing needed to solve the crisis of some Third World countries amounts to billions of dollars. The bill for the developing countries alone has increased from 30 to 40 billions.

[Question] Do you think that will make the United States act?

[Answer] In presence of the news media, I shall be prudent. I do not believe there is anything that will make the United States act in 1980. All the attention is fixed on the election campaign; the congress now has the possibility of intervening in all the affairs, even the smallest, and that possibility is animated and inspired by domestic concerns. In my opinion, the only reasonable idea is to expect a sympathetic interest from the United States. Therefore, we must act as if they were not there, which is audacious. And that gives the Europeans a formidable responsibility. In fact, they are the only ones who are acting on this subject at this moment.

The Giscard "Trilogue"

[Question] And the "77" in all that?

[Answer] I do not see any one bloc taking any initiatives by itself that have chances of success. In addition, the "77" tend to keep their solidarity with the oil countries who do not have the same interest in the matter. I would even say that the latter are somewhat concerned because they are of necessity contributors of money in this matter. At this time who among the "77" is going to play the role of sniper against the oil countries at the risk of breaking up the "group of the 77?"

[Question] Isn't there another European countries outside the EEC likely to take audacious initiatives?

[Answer] I see Sweden as likely to do that. Unfortunately, when it is Sweden alone, people do not listen. Thus, only the EEC countries can take the initiative. That could be two or three countries followed by the rest of the community. Or the latter followed by other countries. Or even a /Star/. [Word enclosed in slantlinespublished in English.]

[Question] You do not talk at all about the Trilogue dear to Mr Giscard d'Estaing.

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[Answer] Currently, what the finance ministers are studying carefully is recycling. That operation can only be carried out worldwide. It will involve specific applications in the different regions, but it will have to be launched worldwide. The trilogue is not worldwide. Therefore, it cannot play a direct role in the matter.

The problem in addition is not limited only to recycling, which should be accompanied by a growth in public assistance to development. Because there will be interested discounts. Above everything else, recycling will serve the most advanced elements of the Third World. The most disadvantaged will have to be served by public assistance.

What Do the Arabs Want?

[Question] But let us return to the trilogue....

[Answer] That is one idea to which I have been personally very attached for several years. First, for political reasons, because of the common interests of Africa, the Arab countries and Europe and of a wish to be slightly more masters of our destinies away from the superpowers. To me that seem to be essential. Economically, complementarity is as important.

At the level of the trilogue, we have now established a good experiment. It is the Lome Convention. Since its implementation more than 4 years ago, we have succeeded in concluding 47 projects with joint financing. More than half jointly financed with the Arabs, the total amounting close to \$2 billion. For almost 1 and 1/2 years, the ratio has been 1 to 5. When we put 1,000 units, the Arabs put 5,000!

[Question] How do you explain the success of that operation when at the beginning there must have surely been a lot of apprehension from both parts?

[Answer] The Arabs wish to put some money at Africa's disposal. But they have very little possibilities of identifying and, especially, of following on site the projects that they wish to finance. The leaders insist on technical reliability. They are not alone. There is the IMF and the World Bank. Now there is a series of African countries that the Arabs do not know well and where they do not wish to be compromised politically.

What Worries Me....

[Question] Initially, we had the impression that the Arabs wanted to act alone, without having their assistance confused with that of other countries. Listening to you, one would think that they have evolved!

[Answer] The Arabs do not want to gather under any banner and they are right; they want to protect the glory of their involvement. Inversely, some African countries do not want us to make a major political operation of the Arab involvement. On the other hand, our credit conditions are generally more costly than the Arabs'.

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[Question] And despite those contradictions, things seem to be going well?

[Answer] Yes, because the time to normalize has not come yet. What frightens me slightly is the idea of translating this triangular operation immediately into structures and organizations with a higher council, a council of ministers, subcommittees, rules of procedure, etc.

Let us put it in cartoon form. Who can imagine that all the Arab, African and European chiefs-of-state could be brought together in the same garden, even JEUNE AFRIQUE's?

I believe it is very important for the future not to try to formalize, to structure this cooperation too fast. In many fields it would be better to try to be pragmatic. My ambition is to start talking about combined investments with the Arabs.

There must be Arab investments in those countries that wish to have them, in the sectors that they wish: such an Arab country for such a project. But there are some cases where the main interest is to ally Arab and European investments. I have proposed a joint summer meeting between the community and the Arab countries to discuss what we have already done together and find out how to improve on it.

[Question] Don't you feel there is a certain bitterness on the part of the Africans toward the Arab countries?

[Answer] There is no contradiction. The Africans expected much more. Still, what has been done is remarkable.

[Question] Don't you have the impression that Lome II fell short of its objective?

[Answer] Perhaps it is not perfect, perhaps it is out-of-date. That does not prevent it from being the only thing to have been done until now. Of course. Africa is dramatically affected by the worldwide economic crisis. Much more so than the industrialized countries. Now, the Lome convention has held up. It holds fast despite the crisis. It is the most advanced cooperation instrument in the world.

Tanzania Has Failed

[Question] What do you think of what is currently going on in Chad?

[Answer] One would have to be an outstanding ethnologist to understand it. I do not understand any of it. Nevertheless, I must say that our operations go on normally in the southern regions.

[Question] Is the economic experiment tried by President Nyerere in Tanzania a success or a failure?

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[Answer] According to our measurements, it is a failure. The balance of payments deteriorates year by year. Food supplies decrease...But I would not say that it is an absolute failure. Let us not forget that the hike in oil prices hits Tanzania hard. And besides, account must be taken of national pride and dignity. Nyerere is a chief-of-state known and respected well beyond his country's borders. Nyerere's interest in the rural environment is to be admired, even if certain of his actions are technically carried out under appalling conditions.

[Question] One might think that you sympathize more with the countries that have failed than with those that have succeeded.

[Answer] It is true that the Ujamaa experiment is a failure. But it is not for me to judge, much less when the system is based on principles that I believe to be deserving of sympathy.

Gloomy Points

[Question] Before experiments that have failed, you seem to show a certain feeling of guilt.

[Answer] If you wish. In any case, there is within me the will to understand. I believe that each country has the right to govern itself as it wishes. Any effort of the young countries to try to find an efficient and original way of development produces in me understanding, respect and admiration.

[Question] Is it because those countries call themselves revolutionaries and you belong to the French Left?

[Answer] Not at all. I look beyond words and labels to the effort deployed by the countries that are changing the situation. Thus, I have a lot of sympathy for such countries as Niger and High Volts, whose governments are not labeled as leftist.

[Question] What is your opinion of the Ivorian experiment?

[Answer] It is an indisputable, if not an extraordinary, success. All the more extraordinary because it takes part under human conditions that are to be respected. "The Old Man" (President Houphouet-Boigny) is a remarkable statesman.

[Question] The Ivorian experiment must certainly have some negative aspects.

[Answer] Of course. I see two or three gloomy points. First, the fact that agricultural development depends essentially on foreign labor (Mossi and others) can be dangerous. Then, industrial development has engendered an urbanization phenomenon that is at the same time too fast, too heavy and too costly. Finally, the rhythm of economic development has been held up mainly by the prosperity of world economy. Will it be able to hold up during an international crisis? It is a problem.

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[Question] The Ivory Coast seems to have made a bad bet with sugar.

[Answer] The bet could have been won had world prosperity held up. Since we are in a recession, it seems aberrant. The same phenomenon can be seen in Tunisia and elsewhere. Since growth slows down in the world, the Ivory Coast's debt risks becoming serious in the future.

[Question] Wasn't it the Community's experts that advised the Ivory Coast to launch its sugar operation?

[Answer] Definitely not. On the contrary, not only did the EEC never participate in these operations, but it also advised against them. I must even say that the Ivorian authorities were lead by our advise to stop certain complexes.

The Ivory Coast Swindled

[Question] If you encouraged the Ivorian authorities to abandon their sugar program, wasn't it more for fear of the competition that the Ivorian production would represent for European sugar?

[Answer] At the EEC, we do not fear the Ivorian competition at all. What is certain is that the highest Ivorian authorities were badly informed about the state of the world market. The equipment sellers did not even try. That is why the Ivory Coast has been the victim of a swindle, purely and simply.

What Retirement?

[Question] When does your mandate expire?

[Answer] On 5 January, 1981.

[Question] Can it be renewed?

[Answer] It can be renewed. I would like to see our policy carried on. Bloc negotiations, combination of funds and so many other original aspects. I wouldn't like for all that to be lost. Now, it is still fragile. What counts is that my successor, whoever he is, might follow that same route. Then, I believe that there are some very important initiatives to be undertaken worldwide and that we are the only ones that can undertake them.

I would like to be sure that my successor would be really interested in the problems of the Third World; that it will not be someone who comes there because he has a national or European political career. What would bother me would be a passing commissioner.

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[Question] So there you are then a candidate for retirement?

[Answer] I am a bad candidate for retirement. I cannot see me there at all for the moment. When I think about it, I become frantic.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD ALARMED ABOUT RISE OF FDP IN POLLS

Hamburg STERN in German 14 Aug 80 p 106

[Article by Werner Heilemann: "Poaching in the Partner's Territory"]

[Text] The SPD is worried about the recent upward trend of its coalition partner, the FDP--recent studies have accorded the Liberals 9 percent of the votes.

The FDP campaign director in the idyllic Rhine town of Bad Honnef no longer recognizes his party friends. "They are coming suddenly," says part-time politician Hartmut Herren, "and are asking what they can do in the next few weeks for the party."

The FDP headquarters in Bonn has confirmed that the willingness to work for the party and involvement in the party have increased markedly among FDP supporters. And the FDP also knows the reason for this: "The failure in the North Rhine Westphalian elections stirred our people into action." In addition, the Free Democrats have been the center of attention for weeks thanks to their agile economics minister, Gunt Otto Lambsdorff. Whether Count Lambsdorff calls for more productivity on the part of the German workers or draws the line against the SPD on the question of worker codetermination among the miners--the FDP constantly provides headlines.

What gives the Liberals silent pleasure causes considerable worry for their coalition partners. Months ago the SPD comrades feared that the FDP might not overcome the 5 percent hurdle on 5 October but now they are watching as the Liberals are gaining in voter sympathy at the cost of the Social Democrats. SPD Federal Manager Egon Bahr analyzed the situation in a confidential study for his party board: From today's point of view, the FDP can obtain considerable increases in votes from our voter reservoir."

The Bahr paper had such an explosive impact on the SPD functionaries in Bonn that they had it delivered by courier to the chancellor at his vacation home on the Brahmsee. Helmut Schmidt should begin preparing himself for the possibility that the FDP could throw a cog in the wheels of a victory over Franz Josef Strauss.

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SPD theoretician Bahr provided a whole bunch of reasons as to why the small Liberal party (80,000 members) could count on 9 percent of the vote (1976 result: 7.9 percent) on the basis of the most recent Infratest opinion polls. The men around Hans-Dietrich Genscher drew the right conclusions from the unexpected departure from the Landtag in Duesseldorf.

First of all, Minister Genscher stood "shoulder to shoulder" with Chancellor Schmidt in foreign policy questions. Genscher, too, has been stressing independent German interests vis-a-vis the United States. Furthermore, the FDP is playing up completely the "struggle for survival" issue. By making the "existential threat" into a campaign topic, it is appealing simultaneously to the political rationale of maintaining the three-party system and to the sympathy of the FRG voters.

The analysis by the SPD campaign manager Bahr also contains some criticism of the SPD. Because the SPD has so far refused to direct the campaign to a sole Schmidt-Strauss duel, FDP boss Genscher came out looking good. SPD functionaries in Bonn interpret Bahr's comment in the following manner: Genscher has to appear to be virtually indispensable if Schmidt refuses a head-on-head television debate with the Union candidate on the grounds that nothing will be done without the FDP boss. This trend will increase as a result of the fact that the style of the campaigns is becoming more and more a campaign issue. Every fourth citizen, according to the opinion polls cited by Bahr, believes that Genscher and the FDP are fairer and more objective in the campaign.

Unlike 1976, Bahr continues, the FDP is again obtaining supporters from the Union. Every fifth CDU supporter is still questioning whether he should at all go to the ballot box. As Bahr says: "This is clearly a result of the CDU candidate Strauss." With their warnings about an SPD state, the Union leadership may very well drive such undecided Strauss opponents to the ballot box, where they will then most likely cast their votes for Genscher instead of for the CDU.

But Bahr also fears FDP gains at the cost of the SPD. Only 16 percent of all FRG citizens know that the second vote on the ballot slip will decide the strength of the fractions within the Bundestag. As a result of "sympathy for the threatened coalition partner," whose survival would assure the continuation of this government, many potential SPD voters could cast their vote for the wrong party.

Bahr also outlined the results of such a gain in strength for the small party. The more "Union potential" within the FDP, then the more conservative will be Liberal policies in the next 4 years. The more Social Democratic voters the Liberals win over for the elections, the greater will be the shift in the "erroneous assessment of the actual strength ratios" within the coalition. To express it more clearly: the new FDP could put pressure on Schmidt after 5 October with the threat of going over to the Union. As the SPD manager said: "The FDP in Hesse should be given particular attention on this point."

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The SPD manager characterizes the countercampaign for the next few weeks prior to the elections as the "two-vote campaign," so that the FDP does not become too strong and too presumptuous. Every potential SPD voter must become clearly aware that the SPD does not have a single vote that can be given away if it wants to achieve its election objective of again becoming the strongest party just like in 1972. The theme of the SPD election predictions must be that the "FDP will be represented in the next Bundestag" even without borrowed votes.

FDP Bundestag representative Juergen Moelleman perceives "a particular infamy" in the fact that the SPD wants to announce publicly that the FDP chances look quite good. He goes on to say that Bahr wants to "rock" the Liberal supporters "to sleep" and give them a feeling of security. Moelleman would prefer to see the voters perceive a threat to the survival of the FDP. For that reason he still outlines a pessimistic future for the FDP when addressing political rallies: "We have by no means yet crossed the Rubicon."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LOW MORALE, INDIFFERENCE SAID TO PLAGUE BUNDESWEHR

Hamburg STERN in German 14 Aug 80 pp 45-50

[Article by Mario R. Dederichs: "Germany's Weary Warriors"]

[Excerpt] Frustration reigns in the Bundeswehr. Many see no reason to serve, and drinking sprees are the order of the day. Draftees complain that the Bundeswehr teaches indifference and avoidance of responsibility.

There is deep frustration beneath the steel helmets of the Bundeswehr. Defense Minister Hans Apel, abrupt as he is, offers one of his simple answers: "There is no such thing as a life without frustration." Yet virtually nowhere has this kind of low morale increased within 15 months the way it has in the Bundeswehr. A study by its own Social Science Institute demonstrates this with figures: 35.1 percent of the draftees see "absolutely no reason" for the time they have served. Only 55 percent saw some sense in it, "at least in some parts"; this latter figure had been 70.3 percent in a poll taken at the start of basic training. Says Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, defense deputy in the Bundestag: "As regards the soldiers, assessments are made of that which is measurable -- how many tanks are ready; how many vehicles are ready. And the human being is left behind in this bureaucratic organization."

No one denies this. The Bundeswehr has never experienced riots among the soldiers in its 25 years of existence, but taking their place are nightly binges as the only form of recreation. The result: The year 1979 alone saw a total of 3,800 disciplinary actions against drunks in the military. Says Bernd Rehorst, radio operator in Stade: "I almost never used to drink alcohol before, and when I'm home on weekends I drink only colas. But at the barracks, now I'm always getting bombed every day right after work."

There is almost no drinking on the train on Fridays when everyone is heading home. Hamburg Railway Police Chief Bodo Ventzke reports: "We get most of our drunken rowdies on the return trip on Sundays." Then "neon lights are pulled down, folding tables broken off, sliding doors kicked out and

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female passengers bothered." Sometimes it gets worse than that. Relates a waiter in the dining car of the "Seagull" interurban train: "Five men recently came storming in here, ran into the kitchen and knocked the chef into the corner. Apparently looking for liquor. My colleague tried to intervene and got a frying pan beside the head."

The run on the trains started last year when the Defense Ministry gave its soldiers free rides just to get them off the autobahns, for it is on the roads that the Bundeswehr has thus far suffered its biggest losses: 3,916 traffic deaths in the last 10 years. Railway and military police have been riding "the worst stretches" so that they can put brawlers off the train. Says railway policeman Ventzke: "Things have improved somewhat."

Troop morale has scarcely improved. Despite the vaunted concept of "Information and Education," which is supposed to guarantee the soldiers civil rights, shared responsibility and humane treatment, the "citizen in uniform" has a markedly different mental attitude from that of the citizen in civilian clothes. It starts right off with the business of living together in the barracks, where a subculture of brutality and oppression is spreading. "There's no such thing as the camaraderie that is always being talked about in the service regulations," says Corporal Joachim Heid, troop representative for a tank company in Coblenz.

Soldiers Now Fear Their Comrades, Not Their Superiors

Instead of this camaraderie, there is a fear of their "comrades," especially among the newcomers, the "newks." Reservist Gerd Gerdes describes in a book just published on the Bundeswehr* how a "newk" was mistreated in one unit: Even though he had treated the group to a case of beer after having been threatened with a beating, some higher-ranking soldiers forced him to stand at attention for 10 minutes under a cold shower while dressed in his pajamas. At midnight they dragged him out of bed again, bloodied his nose and ordered him to "drop your trousers." Then he was raped.

Defense Deputy Berkhan brought to attention a case in which petty officers performed an "initiation ritual" on a sailor -- after smearing him with beer foam and shaving cream, they shaved off his pubic hair. The objects of such mistreatment usually take their places in the pecking order in silence and wait for their time "to take it out on the next newk" (Gerdes).

On the other hand, harassment by superiors has become more of a rarity, although the latest report of the defense deputy showed that this type of harassment still accounted for 7.3 percent of the 6,595 complaints in 1979 -- 484 complaints, with 746 cases. A "bully" came before the district

* Helmut W. Ganser (editor), "Technocrats in Uniform," Rororo Aktuell, 4525

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court in Tuebingen. Sfc Johann Krettek had beaten and kicked soldiers, taken money from them and made them work on his private automobile. Krettek staged a "firing squad" for two soldiers who had missed a retreat ceremony: He fired his service weapon at them -- with blanks. The court placed him on probation for 7 months and fined him DM 1,000, the judge having determined: "He was a good soldier."

More oppressive for the troops than such isolated cases is their everyday duty, with its low wages and dreary recreational prospects, wasted time and bureaucratic ways. "Time flies during basic training," says army engineer Eberhard Beuner. "After that, every month is an eternity." Beuner had to spend 2 weeks "maintaining the paint job" on a tracked vehicle at his post in Doerverden on the Weser River: "That could have been done in 4 hours, but I had to keep going over it because there was no other work to be done." Also "par for the course" are absurd commands. Just because he had "saluted the wrong way," Beuner was ordered to practice "saluting" in front of the mirror for an hour.

When soldiers griped that every day they were led to meals "in close-order battle array," their commanding officer in Bavaria asked his battalion commander whether this practice could not be abolished out of respect for the fact that "the young citizens are of age." He denied the request -- "for fundamental reasons" -- and ordered: "Nor will it be put to a test."

Anyone Who Refuses To Keep Quiet Can Forget About His Promotion for Years

Orders from above are increasingly encroaching upon the authority of the junior officer level; every little thing is regimented. "The squad leader is no longer able to be on his own in commanding his company," complains Capt Joachim Schaprian of the Army Technical School. "The decisionmaking authority is being shifted to the top, to those who are no longer in personal touch with what is going on." Thus, frustration is also taking hold of noncommissioned officers and officers who "have something to say." They complain about endless paperwork and arbitrary transfers.

They think along political lines only when it will not hurt their careers, for advancement is the main concern with the mid-level leadership structure. Officers who were commissioned at the time the Bundeswehr was established are now blocking promotion of the younger ones. A total of 42 percent of the officers are already too old to serve with the troops -- and there are four equally qualified candidates for every billet that comes open. Says a lieutenant colonel stationed near Bonn: "The scarcity of slots is a constant means of blackmailing officers who are politically involved. Anyone who doesn't keep his mouth shut gets a poorer rating and can forget about his promotion for years."

In the face of such pressure and the burden of the increasing technicalization of the armed forces, discussion of "Information and Education" is receding into the background more and more. Conservative officers like

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former inspector-general Harald Wust would prefer to forget about the subject: "'Information and Education'" no longer exists as a problem." The "father" of the concept, Wolf Graf Baudissin, differs. He wants the concept to be adapted and further developed -- with the addition of political impulses.

Baudissin protege Helmut Ganser, himself a captain in the reserves, has this to say: "Today it is more important than ever to have a strong political leadership which does more than make half-hearted and cosmetic changes." He says that the draftees, nearly half of the 495,000 soldiers in the Bundeswehr, should above all be encouraged to make their voices heard. That is hardly the case at present. "Democracy means responsibility," says theology student Klaus Eldenschink after 15 months of military service, "but the Bundeswehr teaches indifference."

"Morale among the troops is virtually at point zero" -- this is also the opinion of NCO Paul Steinert from Euskirchen. "Most of them say this: I'll put in my 15 months, and then the army can cross me off." Munich sociologist Ralf Zoll has examined the value of such an army in the event of war: 65.5 percent of the young men would sooner throw in the towel than fight a nuclear war. A joke currently making the rounds in the Bundeswehr: A soldier gets a telephone call ordering him back from a weekend pass -- an alert. His first question: "Is it an exercise or war?" Upon hearing that it's only an exercise, he sighs and says: "OK then, I'll be back."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STRAUSS TEAM MEMBER KIEP'S POLITICAL STYLE EXAMINED

Hamburg STERN in German 24 Jul 80 pp 105-106

[Article by Uwe Zimmer: "Double Play of Millionaire"]

[Text] Why CDU Politician Walther Leisler Kiep is supporting Franz Josef Strauss and is nevertheless highly regarded by social-liberals as well.

As a former insurance broker, Union politician Walther Leisler Kiep is no doubt experienced in the business of reinsurance. Publicly, he always demands: "Franz Josef Strauss must know that everybody who wants a change is behind him." In a small circle, however, the minister of finance of Lower Saxony admits point-blank: "By nominating Strauss as the candidate for the chancellorship, the Union forfeited its chance for a victory in the October election."

The CDU man likes to voice such election prophecies especially wherever he can be sure that the federal government will hear about it. The wiry politician is indeed well thought of among Bonn's government officials. Chancellor Schmidt appreciates his "expertise in the area of foreign policy." Horst Ehmke, vice-chairman of the SPD fraction, calls him "my friend of many years." Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher could "certainly see" Kiep "as a member of the FDP," and former president Walter Scheel's "relationship" with him is one "of trust."

It is amazing that a political opponent enjoys so much praise and recognition. After all, Christian-Democrat Kiep is a member of the leading team of candidate Strauss. He is fighting for him as a North German representative and, being the treasurer of the CDU, he collects money for the election campaign of the Bavarian. When he has to show his true colors, Kiep can do that too: "The Schmidt government has mismanaged everything. It must be voted out of office."

But--and that is the reason why he is so acceptable to the social-liberals--he can also be different. When Strauss castigates the federal

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government's hostility toward America, Kiep praises Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher. His pro-American statements cannot "be outdone when it comes to clarity of text." When Strauss warns of a meeting between Schmidt and Honecker, Kiep advises in favor of it. As a matter of principle, verbal contacts with East Europe should be continue in spite of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Consequently, it seems logical as well that he was the only prominent Union official who felt that the chancellor's visit to Moscow contained some positive aspects. "Since Schmidt's visit, the Soviet Union has begun to extricate itself from the vicious circle of the consequences of its invasion," Kiep announced in Washington. "A man crying in a wilderness of demagogy," Lothar Schwartz, speaker for the SPD Executive Committee, stated with satisfaction.

Upon his return from the United States, Kiep went back on his remarks: He had not praised the chancellor, he had reprimanded him. The visit of Bonn's head of government, he said in explaining the meaning of his statement, had punctured the isolation which the Kremlin leadership had suffered for many months. "Leisler Kiep's words were turned around to take on the opposite meaning," CSU chief Strauss stated with a sign of relief.

"After all," Klaus von Dohnanyi--state minister in the foreign office--ventures, "it is nothing but Kiep's familiar public relations trick to appear simultaneously as a white person on a black background and a black person on a white background." Such contradictoriness is indeed part of Kiep's character. Since he joined the CDU in 1961, the sentence, "Kiep is making a correction," has run like a red thread through his officially recorded biography. There is hardly any other leading politician who has had so much trouble when dealing with the press as he has had. When one looks at his constant corrections, one gets the impression that he is always misunderstood, his interviews mutilated and his statements condensed.

The man, who is always friendly, does not resent such adversity. Most of the time he waits a few days anyway before he replies, until the wrong message has had a chance to create a real furor. "Kiep is a master of differentiating formulations," is the saturnine praise of a close coworker of CDU chief Helmut Kohl, and he also knows: "Kiep is always aware of which television camera is running at any given moment and where the photographers are standing."

Kiep's real success comes from using the simple recipe of attracting attention through conspicuous differences from majority opinions, particularly after 1969, when the Union was removed from government by the social-liberals. In opposition to the overwhelming majority of the party, he advocated in 1972 the Basic Treaty with the GDR; in 1975, he recommended to his Union to "finally accept" the ostpolitik of the social-liberal government; in 1976, he voted for the agreements with Poland. By no

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means did he make these difficult decisions only for the effect. Kiep, who grew up in Turkey and feels at home in all world capitals, felt that the change in the foreign policy course was long overdue.

The respect which Kiep enjoys--as "a fair fighter"--among government officials, dates back to this time of ostpolitik debates. Systematic image-building has polished his reputation even more: Kiep is athletic and, if need be, he jumps over obstacles in his dark suit carrying his briefcase; Kiep is youthful and rides to motorcycle shows in a grass-green leather outfit on his wine-red BMW R 75/5; Kiep is dynamic and keeps all his dates and meets his deadlines by using his Porsche Carrera. "My type--Leisler Kiep" are the words he has printed on the T-shirts of his election helpers.

The reason why the 54-year-old millionaire is letting himself be used as a drummer and decoy for Franz Josef Strauss is explained by staff employees at the CDU central office in Bonn in the following manner: "Kiep is dreaming of becoming the minister of foreign affairs." For this purpose he even risked damage to his reputation. At first he supported the candidacy of Ernst Albrecht, his minister-president, for the chancellorship; after the election of Strauss, he changed horses "remarkably fast" (a Kohl coworker).

At the end of last year, when favorable results of opinion polls led to the conclusion that the Union could win the election with Strauss, Kiep--the northern light--did not even shrink from becoming real chummy. During a CSU rally in Kreuth he ate humble pie, and thanks to his excellent connections in Washington he was able to obtain for his new chief an invitation to the White House.

But Strauss did not want to designate him as a candidate for the position of minister. The Bavarian's prejudice against the alert "accommodating politician" (Strauss) runs too deep. The part that Strauss permits Kiep to play instead is serving as a "decoy." Werner Kaltefleiter, the Union strategist, admitted this openly. To the opinion-research professor, Kiep represented above all an advantage in mobilizing the voters in northern Germany, because he "appeals to the liberal element in the Union more than any other person."

The fact that he bet on the wrong horse when he supported Strauss is evident from Walther Leisler Kiep polls from the CDU headquarters. The CDU/CSU lost its position as the strongest party to the SPD weeks ago. If Kiep follows Strauss's recipe and now starts covering himself during the election campaign, he will lose his credibility. "The decoy is trapped," chuckles SPD Vice-Chairman Hans Juergen Wischnewski.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF'S CURRENT INTERNAL FRICTION REVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 Jul 80 pp 62-63

[Article by Guy Konopnicki: "Marchais Is More Afraid of His Party Than of His Adversaries"]

[Text] The PCF rids itself of all those who go to the presidential elections while dragging their feet.

The morale of a political party is like the army's. When a full call-up of troops fails, officers and professional soldiers become uneasy. It is obviously what happened to the Communist Party. Since the electoral deception of 1978, all efforts to breathe life into party cells have been in vain. The militants sulk when they are not openly critical. They mobilize only on protest themes. The permanent party cadres never stop shouting their displeasure. The communist press is now losing a reporter a week, and not just any reporter. Two weeks ago, Jean Pierre Gaudard, chief of the economic section at L'HUMANITE abruptly gave notice. He was seventh in the series of resignations from the Communist Party daily newspaper. The loss is serious; those leaving are less than 35 years old. They have been trained on the job and represented the future of the newspaper. At least two among them, Jean Pierre Gaudard and Jean Weber, had each become a well-known professional in his speciality (economics for Gaudard; social problems for Weber) and esteemed by the readers.

These departures had nothing to do with a conventional unrest within the editorial staff, and it would be most unwise to attribute the responsibility for the crisis to the authoritarianism of L'HUMANITE's director, Mr Roland Leroy, deputy from the Seine-Maritime Department. Certainly, Roland Leroy is not an easy employer. He does not easily tolerate opposition; he seldom listens to his associates and, a major failing in our profession with its privileges and obligations, is the final authority of the party's points of view on the relationship of the facts. Since the newspaper is already heavily burdened with compiling reports for Georges Marchais' appearances in television, there is little room for normal journalistic work. It is one of the causes for the "haemorrhage of quills" that is affecting the daily newspapers on the Faubourg Poissonniere.

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Epidemic of Slamming Doors

The sickness, however, is more serious. The new weekly, REVOLUTION, launched last March, has also been hit by an epidemic of slamming doors. Two members of the chief editorial staff, Francois Hincker and Michel Cardoze, preferred to leave. For Francois Hincker, it was no surprise. A former member of the Central Committee and vehemently criticized in 1978 by Georges Marchais, he was already in purgatory. The elegant Michel Cardoze, however, seemed sure of his future. A brilliant polemist, willingly taking part, with a genuine cynicism, in vicious disputes, or espousing indefensible causes, he seemed cut out for surviving a long time in the communist apparatus.

One must then believe that the climate abruptly became worse just before the presidential elections. It is strictly forbidden to cast a shadow on the future candidate, and Marchais tolerates less than never being opposed.

Some men are potentially annoying; that is the way it was with Cardoze. He is guilty of having been a figure-head of the communist press at a time close to when the Communist Party was promoting the union of the left and preparing to govern with the socialists. Early in the present septennate, Cardoze published a book entitled "49 percent, naissance d'une majorite" [49 Percent, Birth of a Majority]. The 49 percent in question was the re-return Francois Mitterand received during the second round of the 1974 election. Cardoze, however, analyzing the returns, pointed out the birth of a new presidential majority in support of Francois Mitterand. After the appearances of Marchais himself, Cardoze was full of praise for a man who was then the leader of the unified left, none other than the challenged first secretary of a Socialist Party that Georges Marchais considered as his main opponent. Since the party's memory is selective, the book was withdrawn from sale. It is not good to remind the militants of the illusions their leaders labored under scarcely 7 years ago. Cardoze, however, had won his stripes in this affair and it was necessary to take them away from him one day. It was up to the party to push a person to the exit. The party began by assigning him more responsibilities, a matter of making him slip up on banana peels that without fail were thrown in front of him. That was how Michel Cardoze became chief of the cultural section on L'HUMANITE's staff, then editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper, "REVOLUTION". While he was with L'HUMANITE, Cardoze had to rework considerably his column, which did not happen without some dissatisfaction . . . The old traditionalists, such as Andre Wurmser and others, did not much care for this dandy, too responsive to popular Parisien intellectual ideas. As for Georges Marchais, he let it be known upon several occasions that the cultural column of L'HUMA was a bit above the workers' level. It did not take much to bring about this shift. The Secretary General of the Communist Party is confusing the workers' cultural level with his own.

After that Cardoze found himself in charge of an impossible mission: to create a newspaper acceptable to communist intellectuals. It was badly timed: the intellectuals involved were in full insurrection and were for

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their party leadership hammer and tongs. The editors of "REVOLUTION" were between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Hermier: The Man Who Makes Them Toe the Mark

One one side, Guy Hermier, polite and cold, defending, without flagging and with an even-tempered humor, the Communist Party line. On the other side, the communist intellectuals. Unconditionally Georges Marchais' man, Hermier did not come to the 'REVOLUTION' to round out the corners; he is the man who makes them toe the mark. During his youth, Hermier cut his teeth on the Communist Students Union which he normalized in 1965. He then rose through the ranks and then sought a deputy's seat in a region where the communists are traditionally at sword's point with the socialists--the Bouches-du-Rhone Department, Gaston Deferre's constituency. Hermier did not come to terms with the options defended by Georges Marchais; he accepted no compromise and his whole character helped him to hold up in all situations.

Michel Cardoze has known Hermier for a long time. They are about the same age and had been together as communist student leaders. Life, however, had provided them with diametrically opposed experiences. Hermier became an apparatchik which went well with his cold personality. Cardoze is a journalist, a specialist in cultural matters; he maintains contact with intellectuals. When Francois Hincker handed in his resignation, it was a shock. Cardoze did not help Hermier to lop off heads. He remained silent during a decisive meeting. Above Hermier, there was an angry man: Marchais himself.

Editors Circulate Secrets

The whole press tells about the meetings of the REVOLUTION's editorial staff, and the press is well-informed. The editors of the weekly newspaper violate the party's sacrosanct rules, by circulating secrets. Everybody knows that Guy Hermier is his own man in a hostile editorial staff. Even his old friend Jean-Michel Catala, Central Committee member, kept aloof during the decisive meeting. A muffled grumbling is heard among the journalists, and that Marchais cannot tolerate. Among the journalists, there is Cardoze reminding Marchais of the union of the left and of his allegiance to Francois Mitterand. The candidate for president of the French Republic can in no way put up with it. He can put up with it even less since he is afraid of finding himself in a difficult situation. For the first time, a Communist Party Secretary General is a candidate for the highest office. He needs the whole party's support. The political machine must move forward. The propaganda bulldozer must push all communist voters to the polls; there can be no defections, otherwise the machine is jammed up. It is honeycombed with men, for example Michel Cardoze, who banter ill-naturedly, who hang back; men who do not consider Marchais the revolutionary example of our time. These men can be found everywhere in the Party; they are departmental secretaries, journalists, Central Committee members, or mayors of large cities. They are the general secretary's obsession. A man who sees himself as his

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Party's unopposed candidate. Life is made impossible for one many among them, and Michel Cardoze's resignation will cause all those in the Party apparatus to reflect before dragging their feet to the presidential election.

During an Election, All Disagreements Are Put Aside

It is indeed that and only that. In every election the Communist Party cuts its handicap thanks to the extraordinary striking force of its militant apparat. During an election, all disagreements are put aside, and a united Party throws itself into the fray. During an election there is no room for dissent. Yet, after more than 2 years' effort, Georges Marchais has yet to succeed in obtaining the necessary agreement. He is afraid of facing a fight with a sick organization behind him. So he chose to strike in early summer. In September he will have his candidacy put forward during the HUMA-TINE [sic] festival, and it will be necessary for the whole party to put aside its disagreements so that it can hurl itself into the presidential race. From now on, however, it will be necessary to do away with all confirmed or potential contestants. Marchais knows that he is staking everything he has. Even the lowest levels of the party are awaiting the outcome of the vote. One point below 18 percent and Marchais is finished. In the Central Committee, in the immediate circle of the secretary general, the wolves are watching their prey. They are awaiting the fall of this musical comedy despote, this television Marxist. In fact, Georges Marchais has more to fear from his own party than from Mitterrand, Rocard, Chirac, and Giscard put together. It is from within that strongholds are threatened. And George Marchais is the lord of a fortress besieged by its defenders.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POLICE DEMONSTRATIONS INDICATIVE OF DISCONTENT

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 28 Jul 80 pp 12-15

[Article by Philippe Krasnopolski]

[Text] Demonstrations in the streets, over-zealous strikes: anger spreads to police headquarters. Orders are questioned.

A spray and a cortege of a thousand people: such was the tribute rendered to the memory of Jean-Michel Jammé by his colleagues. The young policeman was killed on 18 July during the aborted attempt to assassinate Mr Shahpour Bakhtiar, the shah's former prime minister.

A tribute indeed. But also a demonstration. A silent one. "We want efficient measures against the settling of scores between rival factions of Near East countries, of which we too often are victims," an inspector comments.

Two years ago, on 31 July, another policeman, Jacques Capela, was killed during the capture of hostages at the Iraqi embassy in Paris. Enjoying diplomatic immunity, his assassins, Iraqi "diplomats," were released. Angered policemen took the streets.

"Any laxation on the part of the government, as was the case for the terrorists of the Iraqi embassy, would stir grave perturbations in the midst of the national police," warned Mr Bernard Deleplace, spokesman for the Autonomous Federation of Police Union (FASP).

At the closing of the ministerial council, Wednesday, the president of the Republic responded:

"France will not stand to be used as a base for foreign nationals wanting to organize violent actions. Necessary dispositions will be taken to protect the national territory."

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"I expect the judicial process of our country to be carried out in a quick, exemplary and rigorous way," declared Mr Christian Bonnet a few minutes after the official funeral of the victim, in Nanterre.

One year from the presidential election, Mr Giscard d'Estaing and his minister of the Interior remember that it was a police demonstration in front of the Palais-Bourbon that accelerated in March 1958, the fall of the 4th Republic.

Now, for 4 years, these demonstrations have a tendency to spread more and more frequently to the streets.

--October 1976, more than 10,000 assembled for a meeting, Porte Pantin in Paris. From 1968 to 1974, they had been "taken care of" ("loved," some of them even said) by their minister, Mr Raymond Marcellin. Two years after his departure, they seem to detect in their new superiors a feeling of indifference or scorn.

--20 January 1979, 400 or 500 policemen demonstrate from the Bastille to Notre-Dame. To protest against the wave of violence of which they are the victims, they say: 15 wounded in their ranks within 2 weeks.

--24 October 1979, it is the turn of the inspectors. They protest against the insufficient coverage of their expenses: 10 fr for a meal in Paris.

--March 1980, 57 policemen are questioned by mobile gendarmes. They were protesting against their new work schedule.

--This month, over-zealous strike among the CRS following sanctions affecting 10 of them belonging to the CRS 60, in charge of order during the last Cannes festival. They had refused to occupy their quarters, which they felt were too exiguous.

--Last, the refusal of chiefs of police to accompany bailiffs during eviction, one of them having been called before the law by an evicted family for trespassing.

"Today, everybody in the police has a reason to grunt," states the secretary general of the union of police captains, Mr Jean-Claude Riquois.

These fever spells are indicative of a more profound malaise. Policemen feel unloved by the public and scorned by the government. The ill use of units, the lack of materiel, add to a feeling of inefficiency, this one shared by the public opinion. And to a feeling of insecurity. ("The security of the population depends on the security of the policemen," proclaimed a streamer during the demonstration in January 1979.) "The police isn't any more but an army without soul," was Mr Claude Martin's diagnosis.

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RPR representative in Paris, he has just introduced to the Assembly a bill aimed at the creation of a "national council of the security and police function" in order to define and specify the missions and the role of the police.

According to a survey published 3 months ago, 67 percent French feel however that their rapport with the police is "rather good." And 54 percent said they were ready to encourage someone they know to join the police force. For more concrete statistics: the number of candidates for the profession of policeman, 38,000 in 1979 against 12,000 in 1974, for about 4,000 job openings a year.

But the statistics must be corrected as well as the survey. "There is no sense of vocation in policemen today. The recruits are more and more motivated by the search for stable employment," remarks Mr Gerard Monate, formerly responsible for the Autonomous Federation of Police Unions. Even without vocation, the increasing number of candidates (for which the economic crisis is responsible) allows nevertheless for a better selection.

As for the survey, it does not take into account the difference between the policemen of provincial areas, well integrated, and those of large agglomerations, little appreciated (they are often judged only through their directing of the traffic.) Presently, the latter are more numerous. Thus, 40 percent of the policemen in active duty are assigned to Paris and its suburbs. The majority of the rest being divided between Marseille, Lyon, Lille, Strasbourg and other regional metropolises.

At the same time, and especially in the large cities, policemen have seen the deterioration of their family and professional lives.

"The cop married to the door-keeper, that's over. Today, his wife works in an office and they live in the suburbs," explains Mr Paul Florentz, secretary general of the Union of Commanding Officers and Officers of the National Police (SCO-CGC).

Thus, only 18 percent of Parisian policemen live in the capital. The others live in the environs sometimes as far as 50 km from Paris, and 2 percent outside the Ile-de-France region. Result: long commutation sometimes done 4 times, on days of "long round" (duty starts at 0630, stops from 1200 to 1900, ends at 2330.)

Schedules are another reason for bitterness: a 42 and 1/2 hour week, in spite of a ministerial circular of 9 November 1979 fixing the length of duty at 40 and 1/2 hours.

Since the Paolini report (name of a former prefect of police today director of Mr Christian Bonnet's cabinet) estimating that "90 percent of the premises used by the Parisian police ought to be shut down because of their unsanitary state," working conditions have not improved much.

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In the police stations, the story is told of a police rescue van breaking down in the middle of an avenue. Or that of a security guard refusing to drive a vehicle with worn tires: to draw the attention of his superiors, he gave a ticket to his own van. At the maintenance department of the prefecture, MacDonald Boulevard, he was not given new tires, but those of a wrecked van.

The increase of the units is also part of the demands. "We have one policeman or gendarme per 305 inhabitants," keeps repeating nevertheless Mr Christian Bonnet. "We are only surpassed by Belgium who has one per 303."

The policemen, in fact, are badly used. According to a report of the administration's General Inspection, turned a year ago to the minister of the Interior, 10,000 policemen were until now diverted from their security function. To fill typist jobs, even gardeners. In the Parisian region, 10 percent are assigned to the surveillance of embassies and personalities. This is what they call "being a live decoration," and it lasts 7 hours. All these guards are picked from the district police stations.

There are, at last, problems of organization. Thus, the reform of 1977, decided by Mr Poniatoski, put in application on 1 January 1978, puts the urban corps (in uniform) under the command of police chiefs (in civilian clothing). Major consequence: a limited career for the policeman since from now on the highest rank is that of commandant. Less attractive. There aren't today but 400 officers for 41,000 policemen. "These men accept with difficulty being under the order of 'civilians,'" says commandant Roger Flattet, president of SCO. "Especially since those are not always competent."

Commandant Flattet recalls how a "civilian" in charge of insuring the security of the president of the Republic during his visit to Saint-Maixent, 8 May, was not able to stop demonstrations. Mr Michel Mosser, head of cabinet at the Elysee, had to take command and clear the way for the official cortege.

To the incompetence, irrationality is sometimes added: on the last 1st of May in Paris, a police chief had been put in charge of setting up the formation of the units. But the officers were operating in civilian clothes.

Last cause of disagreement: the rivalry towards gendarmes. With 72,000 men placed under the authority of the minister of Defense and put at the disposition of the minister of the Interior, the gendarmerie is the second "police" as much judiciary as well as for the reinforcement of order.

"The gendarmes were better tolerated by the population, being in a permanent contact with it," said Mr Jean-Claude Riquois. "The government pampers them more than it does us."

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Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing was especially interested in the gendarmes, on 11 March 1977 at the gendarmerie school of Melun. He waited until 25 January 1979 to go to the National Academy of Police Officers in Cannes-l'Ecluse, Seine-et-Marne. Policemen did not understand this delay of 2 years. How to explain the "radicalization" of policemen? "Their young age," said the head of five central offices of the judiciary police. According to him, 80 percent of them were recruited after 1968, the large battalions hired after the Liberation being now retiring. Besides, many had a different occupation before joining the police. They have thus been involved in labor unionism.

To regain them, the government has appointed a new chief executive of the national police: Mr Maurice Lambert, a 60-year-old resident of Limoges.

An anecdote illustrates the urgency for action. At the police headquarters of the 1st arrondissement, during the morning rollcall, a policeman asks permission to be heard to the surprise of the officer (a captain) and his 50 colleagues.

"The captain gives us orders to defend capital," he says. He alludes to a mission that involved the protection of a private establishment. On the spot, the captain drafts a report. The policeman is reprimanded. But under the pressure of the unions, the prefect of police declares the sanction null and void, and it is even struck from the service log book. The captain requested his transfer.

Police and Gendarmerie

108,700 policemen	72,306 gendarmes
of which:	of which:
<u>judiciary police: 15,150</u>	<u>departmental gendarmes: 43,362</u>
<u>urban police: 54,000</u>	<u>mobile gendarmes: 17,426</u>
<u>CRS: 14,600</u>	<u>republican guard: 2,855</u>
officers of judiciary police:	
<u>6,629</u>	<u>14,826</u>
gross income:	
<u>peace guards, 4,000 fr (1)</u>	<u>gendarme, 3,500 fr (1)</u>
<u>police chief, 6,500 fr (1)</u>	<u>captain, 4,500 fr (1)</u>
(1) around	

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CHANGE IN NATURE OF CORSICAN TERRORISM NOTED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 23 Aug 80 pp 42-43

[Article by Michel Labro and Jean-Louis Eyssartel: "Midnight on Fesch Street in Corsica"]

[Text] People had become almost accustomed to Corsican acts of violence. Today, however, Corsican terrorism is frightening. What has changed?

The very few passers-by on Fesch Street in the heart of the old section of Ajaccio never batted an eye when they recognized the muffled sound of detonating plastic bombs the night of 15 August. A few hours earlier in Diamant Square, the city had quietly celebrated the 211th anniversary of Napoleon's birth. Plastic explosives are now a real part of Corsican life, in the same way as the cult of the Emperor! Some 2,000 acts of terrorism have been committed in the Isle of Beauty these past 10 years. The most spectacular of these were the destruction of an Air Inter Caravelle airliner on Bastia's airport in 1974 and an Air France Boeing aircraft on Ajaccio's airport in 1976. Insurance companies calculate they have had to pay more than 20 billion centimes in damage claims.

This summer, however, police have scored major successes against bomb-wielding terrorists. Notably with the arrest on 5 August of the 31-year old Jeannick Leonelli, Police had been looking for this man ever since the events of 6 January 1980 in Bastelica, Corsica. That day, autonomists had intercepted Leonelli and two associates, a gunsmith from Ajaccio and Major Pierre Bertolini, the former commander of the local Civil Security force, both of them well-known anti-autonomists. The autonomists claimed the three men were preparing to attack one of their members and so they had decided to sequester them.

In a sensational turnabout, it was then learned that Leonelli was actually an "agent" whom the autonomists had infiltrated among their adversaries. He reportedly was the one who had alerted his friends about Bertolini's planned attack. The incident had ended in bloodshed after occupation of an Ajaccio hotel. As for Leonelli, he disappeared.

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Some 4 months later, on 14 May, a red BMW rolled slowly by the Iranian Embassy on Avenue d'Iena in Paris. The occupants of the moving car machinegunned the security police squad guarding the embassy. Two of the policemen were seriously wounded. The FLNC (Corsican National Liberation Front) claimed responsibility for the shooting. It was meant to "avenge" those young Corsicans whom the State Security Court had severely sentenced a few days earlier.

The police conducted an investigation during which they obtained one name, that of Leonelli, the man of Bastelica. Arrested in Tarascon, he admitted being responsible for arming Corsican terrorists and making bombs for them. The next day, investigators arrested two other men in Marseille: Jean-Paul Perrot and his friend Jean-Paul Albertini. With Leonelli, these two men had constituted an FLNC support base in southern France. In their apartment on Neuve Sainte Catherine Street--the building in which Gaston Deferre lives--police found kilograms of explosives, tens of meters of detonating cord, weapons of all kinds, forged identity papers, and boat tickets to Corsica. The trio were making preparations for other acts of terrorism planned for after the summer vacation season and aimed particularly at port facilities in Marseille and oil storage tanks at Berre-L'Etang.

The three men confessed to a combined total of 59 acts of terrorism since 1976. Their arrest was a severe blow to FLNC activists on the continent.

In Corsica itself, a certain number of documents have furnished valuable information on the FLNC's organization. These papers are exhibits to be used in the case of those Corsican nationalists scheduled to appear before the State Security Court in September. The documents were seized in November 1978 during a police raid conducted prior to the prime minister's visit to Corsica. In an FLNC "cache" at Biguglia near Bastia, the police uncovered a veritable file and records depository maintained by the clandestine movement. These documents revealed the movement's exact strength, namely 374 active members and some 170 staunch sympathizers. The 374 militants included 69 members of military commando units. The FNLC has some 30 MAT-49 [submachineguns] and some 20 STEN [submachineguns], one automatic rifle, a few military rifles, hand weapons, and an impressive quantity of agricultural and construction explosives. The documents also reveal that some extremists had had contacts with foreign terrorist movements. Chief inspector Jacques Franquet, head of the Criminal Investigation Department's regional office in Ajaccio, confirmed that "two FLNC militants met with some Palestinians in Lebanon in March 1978, but they drew a blank. The Palestinians did not take them seriously."

This heavily bearded, bespectacled, short "cop" has waged merciless war against the clandestine forces ever since his arrival in Corsica. He knows that once night falls, a peaceful retiree, or a small craftsman or shopkeeper above all suspicion, can become transformed into a bomb-wielding terrorist. Activists are drawn from all classes of the island's

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population, and not necessarily from the most marginal classes. Inspector Franquet told us that "the rule of silence is no more operative here than elsewhere. I have as much information on an act of terrorism in Corsica as my colleagues have on an armed robbery in Lyon."

The "clandestine forces," as they are called in Corsica, had long been surrounded by a certain aura. Their bomb blasts had at least the merit of showing the government that everything was not going smoothly on the island. And furthermore, these Corsican Robin Hoods had established a rule of never shedding blood. The increased number of plastic bomb attacks --and plastic bomb counterattacks--eventually turned public opinion against the "clandestine forces." Especially since in addition to the politically-motivated attacks, the number of racket-related and revenge-type attacks also began to increase.

A second factor is now working against the FLNC, namely the increasingly sharp break with the autonomists. Many young Corsicans had found clandestine activity fascinating. They were the ones who, shortly before the events in Aleria in 1975, had urged the autonomist leadership to take a more radical stance. They delivered the following ultimatum to Edmond Simeoni, one of their historic leaders: "Make up your mind, Edmond! The rifle or the fishing pole?" The death toll at Aleria and Bastia, plus the long series of acts of violence that followed, made people think twice. "Violence is ineffective and dangerous," Simeoni told the UPC (Corsican People's Union) Congress on 10 August. To better disassociate himself from such violence, he unhesitatingly devoted one-third of his 50-minute speech to the FLNC.

The truth is that the nature of Corsican terrorism has changed. In the past, it was almost viewed, on the island, as part of the folklore. Today, however, it is frightening. The perpetrators of the attack on the Iranian Embassy shot to kill. For the first time. In Corte on the night of 9-10 August, terrorists machinegunned the gendarmerie headquarters. Five of the bullets riddled a bedroom usually occupied by children.

It is not easy to determine exactly where the FLNC stands within the political spectrum. The recently arrested FLNC members had contacts with the extreme right. Claude Viellecazes, Ajaccio's prefect, explained that "within the FLNC there are extreme leftists and pro-Fascist elements."

What is certain is that there is a new generation of terrorists. It is more interested in direct action than in ideology. Hence it not loath to pattern itself on foreign terrorist movements, on the Red Brigades, for example, rather than on Pascal Paoli.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

LOCATION, MISSION OF FOREIGN LEGION DISCUSSED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish No 24, Apr 80 pp 43-47, 49-50

[Article by Vicente Talon, special correspondent in France]

[Text] This elite corps, which was founded by King Louis Philippe in 1831 and which made its first weapons, based on a premonition, during the conquest of Algeria before it was ceded to Queen Isabella II of Spain 4 years later, had among its ordinaries one very clear-cut rule: never be on the job within the borders of the mother country. Being on the job, of course, was one thing, and being quartered a quite different one, but by 1962 most people felt that under the circumstances the very existence of the Foreign Legion had ceased to hold interest. It was by that time, people said, a glorious but useless institution, and some even regarded it as potentially dangerous. A sort of poisoned fruit from the past.

The dissolution of the First REP [Foreign Paratroopers Regiment], which had supported the clumsy "putsch" aimed at cutting off the negotiations between the Paris government and the representatives of the Algerian National Liberation Front, gave rise to major question marks regarding the Foreign Legion's immediate future. People back in France, influenced by distorted images of reality, had no love for the legion, and although its services were still useful in a number of overseas possessions, it could clearly not be kept permanently stationed in its entirety in them, because that would have entailed another lengthy string of serious problems.

With death in their souls on account of the defeat that they had just suffered and without knowing what would become of them the next day, the legionnaires made their bedding in their Algerian camps. The most important of them, their actual headquarters, was located some 80 kilometers south of Oran at Sidi bel Abbes. There, at a large Moorish fort known as Camp Vienot, located in the center of a city founded in 1843 by and for the legion, the legionnaires held on to priceless remembrances that they planned to take with them, including, of course, the mortal remains of their fallen. But it was no use;

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the task was impossible, and they had to reduce the evacuation to the simplest of symbolisms by exhuming the coffins of General Rollet, a legendary figure after 34 years of service in the Foreign Legion; of Prince Aage of Denmark, the no less celebrated legionnaire who died in 1940 as he commanded a battalion, and of the last legionnaire who fell in combat against the Algerian "fellaga."

These glorious spoils, along with the large monument in the weapons yard at the Sidi bel Abbes barracks, the objects in the local museum and other items were shipped to Aubagne, near Marseilles, while they burned a flag taken during the battle of Bac Nihn in Indochina, which according to tradition could not be left behind on Algerian soil.

A Problematic Relocation

As had been anticipated, stationing the legion in France was difficult, and a wide range of problems were created. In Corsica, where they ran across many French settlers (the "pieds noirs") who were expelled from Algeria, the legionnaires were responsible for a number of unpleasant episodes; this was not at all unexpected, however, from men who after living amid drum rolls, in the heat of battle and in constant danger, were suddenly condemned to observe strict but monotonous, unmotivating regulations. As Colonel Devouges, second commander of the Foreign Legion, told me:

"The legionnaires had their problems, and the civilians had theirs. There was no bridge towards understanding, and there were a lot of stories and platitudes, mostly negative, about the legion. That is why conflicts arose, but they were gradually resolved."

I found out that this was true in three very different places: Aubagne, Orange and Castelnaudary.

Aubagne, the headquarters of the legion command, is in fact a district of Greater Marseilles, where the legionnaires live within what we could define as a macrouurban-industrial framework, governed by a Communist city council. Even though the French Communist Party is always calling for the dissolution of the legion, the men in the white kepi have cordial relations with everyone, even the councilmen.

Orange, a small city (25,000 inhabitants) in the provinces, has certain tourist attractions, good wine and, of course, a Communist city council. Everything also runs smoothly here, and on more than one occasion the mayor has had friendly encounters with the legionnaires, such as, for example, when he offered the imposing site of the old Roman circus to the First Foreign Cavalry Regiment, garrisoned there, to celebrate the historic Cameron Day, recalling the corps's most outstanding feat of arms.

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Some 400 kilometers from Orange, between Languedoc and the Aquitaine, lies Castelnaudary, with a population of just 12,000 and a mayor's office controlled by Jacques Chirac's party, which is a rarity in southern France. Because this is a small town, when a controversial unit like the Foreign Legion Training Regiment, which had been in Corsica until that time, was stationed there, the locals were somewhat fearful of the consequences, but today, 4 years later, there is no trace of fear left. As we were leaving Carcassonne, amid an awesome snowfall, for Castelnaudary, Commander Cler, who had come to pick me up, commented:

"I have been in 12 garrisons in France during my military career and I have never met people so friendly and willing to have close ties with us. I have a lot of friends in town."

And that is how it must, in fact, be because in Castelnaudary the legion has an officers club and two training fields, which private individuals have allowed it to use free of charge.

General Goupil himself, the commander-in-chief of the legion, a youthful and athletic man (who, revealingly, refers to a dictionary close by when a shade of meaning problem arises), explained to me that the legion has adequately demonstrated that it is just like any other branch of the military and that it does not cause anything more than the customary incidents when a group of young men are together. He went on to say that although in the beginning, after the evacuation from Algeria, no one in France liked the legionnaires, now there are dozens of cities and towns trying to lure them. Also, there was a veritable boom in requests when after the independence of Djibouti, people thought that the legion troops stationed there would be sent back to France.

If on the one hand the legionnaires' novelesque reputation gave way to a very different reality, on the other, housing them is very appealing from an economic standpoint. Moreover, people like to have a military unit "at home." Therefore, people commonly say, in a perfectly comprehensible play on words: "When the legion arrives, everyone weeps; when it leaves, everyone weeps too."

A Lengthy Process of Change

The new concept that the French have of the legion was not the work of one day. Achieving it took many years, major efforts and a mind both open and receptive to changes that did not, however, touch what the legion considered vital and immutable. And as they moved from Algeria to Corsica, the hardest and most bitter of the periods of change, they introduced a number of innovations, such as a return to the shortened training system and the adoption of alternating tours of duty overseas and back home.

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Another major change introduced after the end of the war in Algeria had to do with training, which was intended to toughen legionnaires with its harshness and by the isolation to which they were subjected. At that time they did little writing, rarely received visits and always had a fearsome Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads: the disciplinary company. All of this was preserved when the legion came to Corsica, but when as a result of a number of unfortunate incidents, it had to transfer to the mainland, there began what some called, not at all pejoratively, the "domestication" [metropolization] of the legion.

The disciplinary company disappeared, as well as troop isolation, since now for the first time legionnaires could make phone calls to anywhere on the planet without any problems, neither official nor technical, or receive visits from their relatives anywhere in Europe, who were just a few hours drive or plane trip away. Furthermore, training no longer took place at remote spots; it was very often watched by onlookers.

The recruiting method was also changed. As in so many other activities, scientific advances were introduced that enabled candidates to be selected rigorously enough so that only one out of four makes it through the initial screening. This operation takes place in Aubagne, where the hopefuls arrive and are immediately accepted on a provisional basis. Those wishing to conceal their identity because they have committed crimes of minor importance or because they have family or any other sort of problem that is not serious, can do so and, if they subsequently change their mind, take up their real names again. But the legion, contrary to legend, does not accept illegal aliens or criminals. The real identity of each legionnaire is, however, maintained in safekeeping in Aubagne and is never revealed. Hence, as far as the head of a regiment is concerned, legionnaire XX goes by the name that he put down when he enlisted, not by his real name. This shyness is so extreme that shortly before I began my program, Colonel Devouges cautioned me:

"Try to photograph groups, never foreground shots of faces, unless they agree, because the family of one of them might find out from your photo that he is a legionnaire."

The Training Process

During the first 2 weeks, which are spent in Aubagne and during which legionnaires can change their minds and opt out of their contracts, in contrast to previous rules, they are subjected to all sorts of tests, questionings, medical exams, etc, to determine, first, whether they are suited for the work that is in store for them and, then, where their capabilities lie. The best men are assigned to the

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combat units; the next best to support units, and the least gifted to the infrastructure. As Commander Mayer told me:

"We modify the cultural and intelligence tests every 5 years because young people change quickly now, and furthermore, the average age of the enlistees continues to drop. It fell over a 5-month period from 1978 to 1979 and currently stands at 22½. Since most do not know French or speak it very badly, the tests are explained to them in their own language by monitors who are fellow countrymen."

So that I could get a better idea, Commander Mayer showed me tests in Spanish that had questions such as what Spanish city is the most famous for its textile industry, which was our Golden Century, under whom was Cardinal Alberoni minister and whether the spelling "botella" or "boteya" is correct.

Curiously enough, the average intelligence of the legionnaires last year (10.49) was higher than the average of their colleagues in the regular army.

From Aubagne, which consists of a series of very elegant buildings surrounding a weapons yard in which stands the monument to the legion's dead (the one brought from Sidi bel Abbes), as well as the corps's impressive museum, on which alone a lengthy article could be written, the young soldiers march to Castelnaudary to spend 4 months in the Training Regiment. Things are not easy here, its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jean, explained to me, because the old barracks that was intended for 600 men now houses 1,051. In addition, the maneuvers grounds are unbelievably far away: Rivesalt (3 hours by truck) and Castres, Carcassonne and Rieutord (an hour and a half). They are also 3 hours by truck from the Camurac ski resort, not far from the Spanish border, where the city rents them the old rectory.

"In 1982 we will begin laying out a 20-hectare plot of land 2 kilometers from here; everything will be functional and very modern. We will house the regiment at the quarters there and we will get back the specialists training company that, because of a lack of space, is in Corte (Corsica)," the lieutenant colonel told me as he unfolded the project blueprints.

The fearsome legion training of yesteryear, about which thousands of printed pages have been written, has given way to a different training regimen, tough yes, but rational, modern and not at all intimidating. It takes place in a combat group, to prepare recruits for life in the field as infantry soldiers, and they are given every facility. For example, a group will include those who speak French well and those who are having problems with it; at the same time, the former are supposed to be less strong than the latter so that they can help

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their "teachers" with physical work. A spirit of solidarity and cohesiveness is thus developed, but this, of course, is felt by all, since officers, junior officers and corporals spend a great deal of time with the recruits, even during Christmas season.

"The boys arrive from a world in which discipline does not exist, neither in the family nor at work, where absenteeism and emotional instability, etc are common. Therefore, we have to use methods different from those of yesteryear to achieve the same goals," Commander Cler explained to me.

Making a Career

In one of the classrooms, Albeniz, a Spaniard who has been in the corps for 5 years, the last 2 as a sargeant, was showing the recruits on a map of the world the places where the legion has barracks, encouraging them to choose their place of assignment. Here in Castelnaudary there is, of course, an orientation officer who assesses the merits of legionnaires and seeks the best assignment for them. Shortly before the training period concludes, he coordinates with a commission from Aubagne and, naturally, with the recruit in question, who gets to go where he wishes 80 percent of the time.

After consideration is given to what was gotten out of them in Aubagne, plus the results of their training, technique, proven capabilities, intelligence and how they blend into the military, they are usually sent to the Second Foreign Regiment or the Second Foreign Paratroopers Regiment, both based in Corsica, or to the First Foreign Cavalry Regiment, garrisoned in Orange, all of them destined for overseas service. They also go to the 13th Foreign Legion Half Brigade (Djibouti), the Third Foreign Infantry Regiment (Guyana) or the Fifth Joint Pacific Regiment. They are not initially assigned to the First Foreign Regiment because it is specialized, and rarely to the 61st Joint Engineers-Legion Battalion (BMGL), for the same reason, while the Mayotte Detachment of the Foreign Legion is part of the alternating companies system.

Another new and very interesting development is that legionnaires are constantly made to feel that they are appreciated and being guided, so that at the end of their first enlistment period (5 years) they can say that they have not wasted their time, inasmuch as the best men will be placed on the road to officer rank, others will become junior officers, and the rest will return to civilian life with an area of specialization.

"Legionnaires used to wage war, and that was enough. Now it is quite different, because they have to want to move up the ranks and take advantage of every opportunity offered them, which are many, to do so. There was a time when it was customary to find men who after

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15 years of service were just first or second class legionnaires. Now, if a person does not attain a rank after 5 years because of shyness, laziness or poor conduct, we are not interested in him and we dispense with him. There have even been major innovations over the last decade. For example, there are currently a great many corporals, because this simple promotion shows legionnaires that we appreciate their dedication and that they are being given responsibilities in exchange. This is a big stimulus, especially for individuals who before coming here, as was the case with many immigrants, did lowly work or were shown absolutely no consideration," Commander Bellori of the First Foreign Cavalry Regiment told me.

Our talk took place in a room wallpapered with multicolored cards, which represent none other than a summary record of each one of the legionnaires attached to that unit; from the time that they enter Aubagne, their lives and accomplishments are monitored on a daily basis. The commander went on to say that when dedication or conduct, etc, drops off, the legion tries to find out why and solve the problem. "A person has to show that he is always doing a good job; if he was doing well in Guyana, on the other side of the ocean, there is no reason why he can't here."

A New Aid: Computers

There is no lack of opportunities in the legion to show what you are, and often simply by studying hard or opening your eyes during practical classes. Today, legionnaires can choose from 120 different specialties, ranging from parachute folder to AML marksman and, in the case of junior officers, navigator of LCT landing craft. Many of the courses are taught within the legion, while others are with the regular army, and since dedication must be constant, the needs of the units are more than met. Lieutenant Colonel D'Alencon, the commander of the First Foreign Cavalry Regiment, told me that he has 118 marksmen for his 30 AML-60's, 175 for his 15 AML-90's and 135 drivers for the 50 or so units of this type that he has available.

So thorough is legionnaire training that the units are self-sufficient in tasks such as demolition, combat diving, operations on tall mountains, etc. I witnessed an exercise of the latter variety on Mount Ventoux, the first mountain in the Alps, located by the small town of Gigondas, and Lieutenant Colonel Liege, commander of the Second Foreign Regiment, which is scattered between Bonifacio and Corte in Corsica, told me about the former.

A legionnaire's career, which can be of normal or short duration, rarely takes him to the rank of officer. Only 10 percent of legion officers, General Goupil told me, come from among recruits; the

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rest are French. This is in contrast to the junior officers, corporals and troops, most of whom are foreigners. The French account for a small but not insignificant percentage, although officially there are none, because to enlist they have to claim that they are Belgians, Swiss, Luxembourgers or any other such nationality.

I could, of course, make this article much longer, but because of the available space I will conclude by highlighting the role that computers are playing in running the legion. Because the legion is a small corps, having slightly more than 8,000 men, it can experiment with techniques that are to be applied in the rest of the French Army later on, and information science has been one of them. The headquarters is in Marseilles, but there is a console in Aubagne that puts out a million computer lines a year. Everything comes from here: any piece of information about a legionnaire, about quantitative and qualitative needs for specialists and their classes, about overseas assignments for individuals in accordance with what they have earned, estimates for the future, etc.

"The computer helps us enormously in a thousand different jobs, by saving us time, helping us to deal with surprises and doing away with injustices. Naturally, we are not slaves to it, and if someone who the computer said at one point would be no good as a junior officer later shows that he is, we give him that opportunity," Captain Monnier told me.

Having finished my assignment, I left the legion with the satisfaction of having seen history continue into the modern age. Instead of a fossil or a holdover from former times living off charity and of doubtful utility, I found a well-oiled war machine prepared to successfully undertake the most difficult missions under the riskiest circumstances. These men of war know how to develop themselves in peacetime and, thanks to their powers of adaptation, have seen to it that their legendary motto "Legio Patria Nostra" will live on past the year 2000. This is something that not even Louis Philippe himself could ever have dreamed of when in a stroke of genius almost a century and a half ago, he gave life to the French Foreign Legion.

Locations and Missions of the Legion

In France:

Foreign Legion Group. Headquartered at the Aubagne barracks, this is a command group that, under the orders of a general and a colonel, comprises the First Foreign Regiment, the Second Foreign Regiment and the Foreign Legion Training Regiment.

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First Foreign Regiment. Located principally in Aubagne, it handles services common to the Foreign Legion. Its three companies, which are administrative, can serve, when necessary, as rapid deployment intervention units. As the dean of legion regiments, the First Regiment keeps the corps's relics and traditions at the famous Aubagne museum. It has also has the legion's main band. The First Foreign Regiment has a detachment and its Traffic Company in Paris; the Reinforced Company of Roadway Work in Canjuers; four branches of the Morale Service (assistance) in Provence; three information posts in Paris Strasbourg and Marseilles, as well as 23 recruiting centers.

Second Foreign Regiment. Intended for immediate intervention assignments and capable of taking part both in overseas missions under the Land Intervention Force and in general coverage of France under the National Operational Defense, it is based in Bonifacio and Corte in Corsica. It consists of a support and services company, three combat companies and a specialists training company.

Foreign Legion Training Regiment. Based in Castelnaudary, it receives and trains recruits, organizes them in platoons of student corporals and student junior officers and trains junior officers selected for military and technical certification.

First Foreign Cavalry Regiment. Headquartered in Orange, this is the light cavalry regiment of the 14th Infantry Division; it also belongs to the Foreign Action Force and the 53rd Territorial Military Division. It consists of a command and services squadron, three AML (60-millimeter mortars and 90-millimeter guns) squadrons and a command squadron or "escadron porté."

Second Foreign Paratroopers Regiment. Belonging to the Paratroopers Division, this regiment, based at Calvi, Corsica, comprises: a command and services company; a reconnaissance and support company, and four specialized combat companies (antitank combat and nighttime combat, mountain actions, amphibious actions and rear guard fighting: demolition and elite marksmen).

61st Joint Legion-Engineers Battalion. Stationed at the Cavalry Camp, it includes military engineers and legionnaires assigned to a staff and to a command and services company; a "Legion" projects company and an engineers unit.

Overseas:

13th Foreign Legion Half Brigade. Located in the Republic of Djibouti, it consists of a command and services company, three motorized companies, a reconnaissance squadron and a projects company. This regiment is reinforced by alternating companies from the Second Foreign Paratroopers Regiment.

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Fifth Joint Pacific Regiment. This regiment is stationed on Mururoa and Tahiti, as well as on the atolls of Tureia, Totegegie, Tematangui and Reao. It consists of legionnaires (the majority) and military engineers. It has a command and services company, a projects company, an equipment company, a water and power company and a transportation and repairs company.

Third Foreign Infantry Regiment. Stationed in French Guyana, it has a command and services company and two combat companies in Kourou and an equipment company in Regina. It is in charge of surveillance at the Brazil-Oyapock border, of security at the space testing center and of building a highway through the unexplored jungle.

Mayotte Foreign Legion Detachment. Based on Dzaoudzi in the Comoro Archipelago, it includes alternating companies that do 6-month shifts. The purpose of this detachment is to make the legion's presence felt, but it also does infrastructure work.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PRI'S SPADOLINI: GOOD RELATIONS WITH PCI 'INDISPENSABLE'

LD271017 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 21 Aug 80 pp 1-2

[Interview with PRI Secretary Giovanni Spadolini by Luca Giurato: "We Offer the Communists an Understanding on Banks and Public Industry"]

[Excerpts] Rome--[Question] Senator, Spadolini, the lower house debate on the economic decrees has begun: What will happen if the PCI or the other opposition parties persist in challenging them to the point of obstructionism?

[Answer] The economic measures have been improved in the senate. The communists' contribution was considerable. There was no PCI obstructionism in the senate; I do not see how there could be any in the lower house. If anyone else threatens it, the majority has a precise and obligatory path to follow: It must resort to a vote of confidence.

[Question] That would be the second time in less than a month!

[Answer] The measures adopted have enabled the lira to withstand the renewed attacks of speculation: They have alleviated the situation in the enterprises; and they have provided the initial though as yet imperfect tools for coping with a new phase in the anti-inflation struggle, in agreement with the trade unions. No modern industrial democracy can do without a minimum of social agreement. What are the Polish workers seeking?

[Question] You have just returned from the eastern bloc. What is the gravest threat in a crisis such as Poland's, which is becoming increasingly politicized?

[Answer] The gravest threat is of a Soviet intervention in Poland, at the very moment when the overall balance between the blocs has been entirely shifted to the West's disadvantage (as was confirmed for me during the series of meetings I had in Romania). It is an extreme hypothesis, which is militated against by the sense of responsibility and restraint of all Poles--the strikers no less than the leadership group.

[Question] What is your verdict on the PCI's stance?

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[Answer] I believe Reichlin's article was very balanced. There is no room for manipulation or petty speculation here. The postwar Polish tragedy has complex roots, in which the West is certainly not free of blame. There is a constant, almost heroic, effort to defend a national identity, an individual image. At the start of the 1970's Gomulka's patriotism no longer sufficed; Gierek's new line was needed. Now this in turn is being challenged. Chancellor Schmidt has identified the only path that Western Europe can follow, which is to provide massive economic aid to Poland--a closed and collectivist economy that is trying to open up. But the biggest question is this: Can a potentially advanced industrial society be contained within the network of collectivism? The answer of the Polish strikes seems unmistakable. The debate on the third path is no longer enough. The Polish events transcend any academic approach. And they constitute a pressing cause for thought for the entire European left.

[Question] Has the harsh polemic on terrorism since the Bologna massacre definitively dispelled any chances of resumption of the national solidarity policy?

[Answer] Woe betide us if the democratic forces became split on the issue of the antiradicalism struggle. This is the danger that I highlighted when the option--mistaken, I believe--was taken for a referendum for or against Cossiga and Donat-Cattin. It is the danger that I highlighted again in connection with the first reactions to the Bologna massacre. National solidarity cannot be a government formula, but it certainly is an inalienable way of regarding the institutions--in a country such as Italy.

[Question] Would you care to be more specific?

[Answer] The opposition or majority role must not affect the shouldering of direct responsibilities in this regard. Thus the antiradicalism battle cannot be included in a stocktaking; it is not a subject for stocktakings. As for the dismantling of the secret services, let him who is without sin....

[Question] But there is a very harsh conflict between the DC and PCI secretariats. You met with [PCI secretariat member] Giorgio Napolitano before leaving Romania. What, in your opinion, are the PCI's real feelings? Can a solution of at least good relations with this party be salvaged?

[Answer] It is not only possible, but indispensable. There are many points on which we can establish new relations with the communist opposition. A structure of institutional policy, of the administration of the institutions. Why not consider, for instance, a new law on banking appointments? There is the crisis in the judiciary; the crisis in education; the crisis in the publishing field. There is the very grave crisis in the state holdings sector. How can one envisage a majority closed in on itself on these topics? And the same would apply if the three-party formula were expanded.

[Question] Are the PLI and PSDI pressing for an expansion?

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[Answer] When the three-party government was formed we were portrayed as the advocates of the historical compromise. Dozens of caricatures of me in this guise appeared in the friendly PLI or PSDI papers. I wonder whether or not we were the servants of the historical compromise. If only there were a modicum of self-criticism...but I see no signs of it.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PSI AIDE SCORES ANTI-PSI OFFENSIVE, OVERTURES TO PCI

LD130807 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 9 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Enrico Manca, Italian minister of foreign trade, by Luca Giurato: "We Will Settle Accounts With PCI on Councils"--date and place not given]

[Text] Rome--The socialists unambiguously deny wishing to abandon Cossiga: On the contrary, they intend to encourage and support him. However, they confirm their suspicions about the DC leftwing, which is allegedly plotting against the tripartite coalition. We were told this yesterday by Enrico Manca, the holder of such an important portfolio as that of foreign trade and a great mediator at the most dramatic moments of the PSI's existence between Craxi and Signorile. Among other things, Manca was one of the participants in the summit between Craxi and the socialist ministers at which concern about "Cossiga's physical exhaustion" was allegedly expressed.

[Question] Minister Manca, you see Cossiga every day. What is the matter with him? Why are you concerned?

[Answer] We are not concerned about Cossiga's physical exhaustion. The prime minister has had many troubles; he has had to cope with many difficulties. We are encouraging him to take every valid initiative with the necessary determination to surmount this difficult situation.

[Question] All Italians have seen Cossiga tired, tense and nervous on the television.

[Answer] Cossiga has our solidarity. But solidarity cannot come from us alone. It is essential that his entire party is particularly close to him.

[Question] What political maneuvers is the DC leftwing preparing?

[Answer] Cossiga himself belongs to the DC leftwing. It does not seem to me that these groups daily support the prime minister's stances and commitment as they should. I do not see this support emerging.

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[Question] What specific criticisms do you level against the DC leftwing? Just for once, is it possible to cite actions and names explicitly?

[Answer] Almost the whole of the DC leftwing's conduct has been disconcerting since this government, of which the socialists are an essential component, was formed. A few days ago an article was published by Senator Martinazzoli of the Zaccagnini Group, who spoke clearly of a "socialist illusion." At the last National Council meeting the entire DC leftwing, starting with former deputy secretary De Mita, warned the entire DC against "nurturing a viper in its bosom...."

[Question] Is the viper Craxi?

[Answer] It must be the Socialist Party. These are arguments unworthy of a leftwing--any party's leftwing. These groups are seeking a relationship with the PCI and not with the entire historical leftwing. They are attacking the PSI, which is faithfully supporting one of their men as prime minister. Objectively, we are confronted with a number of blatant contradictions.

[Question] Let us turn from the leftwing to the rightwing of the DC. Fanfani has attacked Rognoni. With his vitality, is the speaker of the Senate preparing to take the place of a weary Cossiga?

[Answer] I do not believe so.

[Question] Over and above the just indignation of the lack of a body-guard for the magistrate who was killed, does Fanfani's exploit also have a political significance?

[Answer] This succession of tragic events is testing everybody's nerves severely. Especially the nerves of those holding particular responsibilities. Perhaps this is the reason for so much unexpected vehemence.

[Question] So there will be no midsummer government crisis?

[Answer] I really do not believe so.

[Question] Will the tripartite coalition last until the socialist congress in November?

[Answer] I hope so. But the problem is not so much that of making short- or medium-term forecasts.

[Question] So what is the problem?

[Answer] There are so many problems, from the recrudescence of terrorism to the economic difficulties. There is also the opposition, which was so harsh, even when the governments were of a very different kind and nature. Has the PCI thought matters out? Does it work where it wishes to go with this exacerbation of political relations?

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[Question] What is this anti-PCI counteroffensive which Craxi would like to launch in the fall?

[Answer] We will open a dialogue on policy with the PCI. If we receive positive reactions, all the better; we will move at last toward constructive relations.

[Question] If the reactions are negative?

[Answer] We will react with all necessary vigor to this aggression. The attack which the PCI is conducting against the government, and its nature and harshness objectively contrast sharply with the PSI-PCI unitary relations on the councils.

[Question] How will the counteroffensive manifest itself specifically? With a rift on some councils?

[Answer] It is, of course, still too early to speak specifically. However, if we were not in mid-August, I believe that a meeting of the groups in the various regions, provinces and municipalities in which socialists and communists cooperate would be opportune.

[Question] For what purpose?

[Answer] To say: My friends, we cannot carry on like this.

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SPAIN

BRIEFS

BASQUE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE LEAKS--Basque males fulfilling their military obligations outside Euskadi will be placed under special police surveillance. Some 50 percent of ETA-M (Basque Fatherland and Liberty Groups) attacks occurred as a result of intelligence obtained by the terrorists from Basque soldiers serving in the Spanish army. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Aug 80 p 5]

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, SOVIET REACTION DISCUSSED

LD041149 London THE TIMES in English 4 Sep 80 p 15

[Editorial: "Effective and Limited Power"]

[Text] Mr Brezhnev has predictably attacked the nuclear targeting strategy recently made public by Mr Carter. He calls it "extremely dangerous for the peoples of the whole world." It is not. It is an attempt to lessen the danger of war by making the nuclear deterrent more credible. A nuclear deterrent fails to deter when the opponent becomes convinced either that he can destroy it in time or that it will never be used. Both questions have raised doubts over the American deterrent in recent years, and Presidential Directive 59, which caused such a stir earlier this month, is supposed to provide the answer. That it emerged amid a series of leaks and an interdepartmental row says more about the Carter administration than about the directive itself. That it was greeted by professions of horror and outrage in Moscow does not argue against it.

In the 1960s NATO switched from a strategy of the tripwire to one of flexible response, because to threaten massive nuclear retaliation in the event of a conventional Russian attack on Western Europe no longer seemed credible in an age of nuclear parity. Now President Carter, confronted by Russian nuclear superiority--in one area anyway--has had to adjust American deterrent strategy too.

The background theory is simple enough--by the standards of nuclear deterrence, anyway. In the 1980s the latest generation of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles should have enough warheads (6,000) with sufficient payload and accuracy to strike twice at each of the United States' 1,000 land-based missiles and still have enough left over to deal with other targets. Only land-based ICBMs are at present accurate enough to hit missiles silos on the other side, so the Americans would have to reply to an attack on their missiles by launching bombers and submarine-launched missiles at Russian cities and large complexes--in the knowledge that the Russians could then reply by obliterating United States' cities. In other words, the Russians could take the

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initiative, and leave the Americans to respond, daring them to attack the cities. Would any American president dare to do so?

The answer is for the Americans to develop their own counterforce options by concentrating more of their missiles on Russian military targets. New missiles like the mobile land-based MX and the air-launched cruise missile should provide Washington with the means of evading total destruction by a Soviet first-strike, and with the accuracy and penetration to reply in kind--thus enabling the Americans to fight a "limited" nuclear war.

The perception is not new. Mr James Schlesinger announced in 1974 that the United States was to place greater emphasis on the destruction of military targets. To accomplish this, however, the United States needed new missiles and a better command and control system. The process was slowed down under the influence of President Carter at the very time when it should have been accelerated. PD59, which lays down a new counterforce policy more comprehensively than ever before, is an indication that President Carter has been converted. That he did not consult his Secretary of State Mr Muskie is a side issue which has helped to recreate doubts about decision-making in Washington, but although the secretary of state should have been consulted, the decision itself was justified.

There are indeed arguments which can still be directed against the new targeting policy outlined in PD59. The most familiar one is that by making the United States' nuclear force easier to use it makes it more likely to be used. But it is just this likelihood that is the essence of deterrence. Another objection is simply that further refinement of deterrence strategy is unnecessary because the risks are already so horrendous that the Soviets would not seriously contemplate a first strike anyway. Could they ever be sure that a United States president would not risk the obliteration of American cities by an attack in Moscow, Leningrad or Minsk? Even the tiny British deterrent presents risks for the Soviets which would seem unacceptable to the Kremlin.

The answer to both these objections is that PD59 enlarges the range of options for the country on whom the Western world must ultimately depend for its security. The Soviets have those options open to them already, although one might not think it from their reaction to the news from Washington. The West should have them too. On balance they make deterrence more credible and thus diminish rather than enlarge the risk of nuclear war.

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